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IntroductIon: Justice and Disadvantages during Childhood –  
What Does the Capability Approach Have to Offer?
Justice for children and during childhood and the particular political, 
social and moral status of children has long been a neglected issue in 
ethics, and in social and political philosophy. The application of general, 
adult-oriented theories of justice to children can be regarded as particu-
larly problematic. Philosophers have only recently begun to explore what 
it means to consider children as equals, what goods are especially valuable 
to them, and what are the obligations of justice different agents have 
toward children. In addition, while philosophers have extensively written 
about global poverty and inequality, the issue of disadvantages during 
childhood, especially child poverty, has only been superficially addressed. 
This also applies to the Capability Approach (CA) as a normative theory. 
Although the socio-scientific and economic literature on how to concep-
tualize capabilities and functionings of children and how to measure them 
in the context of poverty and wellbeing is steadily growing, the normative 
aspects of these issues are still under-theorized. The CA offers a unique 
framework to engage with both the topic of justice for children and 
 questions concerning what justice implies and demands with regard to 
children living and growing up in disadvantaged circumstances. Further-
more, justice and disadvantage during childhood is a compellingly inter-
disciplinary topic that invites the combination of ethical and philosophical 
reasoning together with socio-scientific theories and empirical knowledge. 
In this special issue of Ethical Perspectives we bring together theoretical 
and empirically informed discussions that explore the CA in relation to 
children and the many disadvantages they can face in their lives.
Disadvantages during Childhood
Children face many different disadvantages, several of which can have 
severe and long-lasting consequences if left unaddressed. Because of the 
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particular nature of childhood, children are more vulnerable to certain 
threats regarding their wellbeing and well-becoming, and they depend to 
a greater extent on protection from adults, in most cases their parents. 
In a first step, it seems appropriate to differentiate these disadvantages 
into three broad groups: material disadvantages, social disadvantages, 
and bodily disadvantages. Material disadvantages refer to such phenom-
ena as child poverty, deprivation in housing, clothing or food. The avail-
able data shows that severe child poverty, measured in income terms, is 
widespread and affects more than a billion children worldwide (UNICEF 
2005). Child poverty is not only an issue in developing countries, but also 
in highly developed countries, and the official statistics in the US as well 
as in the European Union show that children are at a higher risk of being 
poor than adults and that roughly one in five children lives in a poor 
household (Arrighi and Maume 2007; European Commission 2008). The 
effects of material disadvantages are as manifold as the disadvantages 
themselves: growing up in an income-poor household can affect the 
child’s physical and mental health, his or her academic achievements, later 
socioeconomic position as well as his or her social inclusion. Children 
living in severe poverty also face death because of the lack of nutrition, 
access to clean water, sanitation facilities or health care. Social disadvan-
tages relate to such phenomena as discrimination based on race, gender, 
health, religion or sexual orientation, the social exclusion that can follow 
from being poor or lacking education, political participation or rights. 
Some of these social disadvantages are built into the way a society frames 
children and the phase of childhood, such as excluding them from voting 
or from having the right to decide for themselves if they want to undergo 
surgery, or where they want to live or if they want to go to school. Thus, 
it can be argued that some of the disadvantages children have in relation 
to adults are meant to protect them and are not really disadvantages 
in the first instance. While this may be true for some, for others it is 
not: if a society allows corporal punishment, for example, this is clearly a 
disadvantage that has little to no benefit for children and their wellbeing 
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and well-becoming. Other social disadvantages do not refer to the status 
of children as children, but to some of their arbitrary features like race, 
religion or gender. Because of such differences, children are harassed and 
bullied by other children as well as adults, the education to which they 
are entitled is withheld, and they find less support by the state compared 
to other children. On a global scale, discrimination based on gender is 
highly prevalent and girls are more often victimized, forced into marriage, 
sexually abused, trafficked or pulled out of school (Croll 2006). Examples 
for bodily disadvantages are physical and mental illnesses, impairments 
and disabilities. Such conditions are to a large extent disadvantageous 
for children due to their environment. A child confined to a wheelchair 
may suffer no basic disadvantages in terms of moving around and reach-
ing the places he or she wants to reach if the environment is adapted 
adequately and if he or she is given the necessary support. Unfortunately, 
even in the most highly developed countries such things are missing, 
which leaves children deprived of many opportunities and also places a 
considerable burden on the family, which has to support the child alone.
It is abundantly clear that these three types of disadvantages are 
highly interrelated, and one can lead to another. Children can be pushed 
into vicious cycles of growing up under material deprivation that impairs 
their health and body, makes them feel ashamed and humiliated, and thus 
leads to experiences of social exclusion. In countries like the US, children 
of colour are much more likely to grow up in poverty, leave school early, 
be faced with violence and are more likely to get arrested and go to jail.
The CA now comes into play not only because it can serve as a nor-
mative tool to evaluate such disadvantages and show why they are unjust 
and should be tackled, but also because it can help to conceptualize 
them in the first place (Robeyns 2006; 2005). This means that the CA 
can assume two different roles: it can help define and research disadvan-
tages, both theoretically and empirically, and it can serve as a normative 
benchmark for them, for example by clarifying how much of a certain 
disadvantage is tolerable and how much is unjust. Both things, while 
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closely connected, are not the same. In the next section, we will say more 
about the CA as a (partial) theory of justice for children. Here we will 
focus on its role as a tool to define and detect disadvantages.
Let us begin with the general premise of the CA, which distinguishes 
between capabilities on the one hand and functionings on the other 
(Nussbaum 2011). Capabilities are, in a nutshell, opportunities or free-
doms to do or be something, like having the opportunity to move around. 
Functionings are, roughly speaking, realized capabilities, such as a person 
actually moving from point A to point B and not only having the ability 
and opportunity to do so. The CA focuses on such capabilities instead of 
resources because it believes that what is really important is what people 
can actually do or be and not what they have. Resources are a means to 
an end; they are sometimes necessary prerequisites for certain capabilities 
and functionings, but they are not especially important per se. Further-
more, by focusing on resources, some important differences that may 
turn out to be unjust disadvantages might go unnoticed. If person A and 
person B have the same amount of money, but A needs much more due 
to a chronic illness and the need to self-finance his or her medicine while 
B is healthy and has no such need, A can turn out to be deprived, since 
his or her money may not be enough for expensive medicine, or because 
A cannot afford proper housing, being forced to invest primarily in his 
or her health. Using this example, the concept of disadvantage based on 
the CA becomes clearer: A is not disadvantaged in terms of money, but 
in terms of what he or she can actually achieve if he or she uses that 
money. He or she is disadvantaged in his or her capability to have a nice 
housing or to be healthy. The third important concept besides capabilities 
and functionings is that of ‘conversion factors’; resources are an impor-
tant example. A conversion factor for being healthy might be access to 
health care, but also good genes, the absence of a toxic environment, 
healthy nutrition, enough opportunities to be outside and to do sports.
Mario Biggeri and his colleagues were among the pioneers in the 
application of the capabilities approach to children’s lives (Biggeri, Ballet, 
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and Comim 2011). They conceptualized children’s wellbeing based on 
different theoretical resources such as Martha Nussbaum’s list of central 
capabilities, the Convention on the Rights of the Child of the United 
Nations, experts’ opinions and also the opinion of children themselves, 
who participated in qualitative research. Biggeri came up with a list of 
14 capabilities that are central for children’s wellbeing, ranging from 
health, love and care to education, shelter and mobility. The basic idea 
behind this list – as it is in general one main pillar of the CA – is that 
children should have the opportunity to really experience or achieve these 
functionings of being healthy, being sheltered or being able to move 
around. It can thus be said that falling short in one of these capabilities 
or lacking it totally is a severe disadvantage a child may face. Most disad-
vantages we have named so far and categorized as material, social or 
bodily can also be detected using this approach. If children are living in 
poverty and consequently face disadvantages in education, health or other 
areas of their lives, they are disadvantaged in relation to the capabilities 
to achieve these things. They suffer from capability deprivation, and 
a lack of money is only a causal factor in this regard. To put it differently: 
many disadvantages are the result of the lack of conversion factors, as in 
the example where the environment is not adapted to children in need of 
a wheelchair.
Opting to use the CA in this way is often a decision based on certain 
normative assumptions. The capabilities chosen by Biggeri should reflect 
children’s wellbeing as a normative concept, meaning that lacking one of 
these capabilities is perceived as being bad for the child, and most likely 
also being perceived as unfair, morally bad or unjust. This, however, need 
not necessarily be the case: a child may have impaired health because 
of a random mutation, which is certainly bad for the wellbeing of that 
child and possibly connected to suffering and harm and some other 
 disadvantages, although it may not be unjust or bad in a moral sense. 
In order to clarify this question, one needs to have a (partial) theory of 
justice or ethics.
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Justice for Children and the Capability Approach 
This brings us to the second role the CA can play in relation to disad-
vantages during childhood. In the literature, the CA is often discussed as 
one such a normative theory that can be used to make value judgements. 
In fact, the two philosophers who developed it and who are still its major 
architects, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, saw it from the begin-
ning as a theory with a strong ethical component that should be used to 
flesh out normative concepts such as justice, development or equality 
(Sen 1980; 2009; Nussbaum 2000; 2011). Indeed, the CA can be consid-
ered by now as a major player in approaches to political and social phi-
losophy, far exceeding its role as a tool for empirically assessing disad-
vantages. It has contributed on many levels to these debates and helped 
identify and clarify – some would claim also solve – some of the foun-
dational problems involved in theorizing about justice and related 
 concepts. For instance, it pointed to some difficulties connected to the 
metric of justice employed by some of the most influential theories 
(e.g. primary goods in the Rawlsian sense or utilitarian welfare metrics) 
and proposed an alternative that consists of functionings and capabilities, 
making normative judgements more sensitive to interpersonal differ-
ences. So far, however, the focus in these debates and formulations of 
the CA has been on adults and there are few suggestions as to what 
a partial theory of justice for children based on the CA might look like 
(Dixon and Nussbaum 2012; Schweiger and Graf 2015).
In our view, such an endeavour implies at least two important tasks. 
First, the theory has to determine or at least to give guidance on how 
relevant capabilities and functionings of children should be chosen for 
assessing their situation in terms of justice. We have already mentioned 
the work of Biggeri and his colleagues, who drew on different theoretical 
concepts to arrive at their list. In doing so, they tried to incorporate 
 different justificatory strategies that have been proposed in the CA. On 
the one hand, they took Martha Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities as 
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a reference point, which Nussbaum claims could be generated on the 
basis of a justificatory method inspired by John Rawls’s idea of a reflec-
tive equilibrium and the notion of human dignity. On the other hand, 
they took seriously the demand made by Sen and philosophers following 
him that it is very important for the generation of adequate lists to directly 
involve persons affected by respective projects, measures or social pro-
grammes. In the case of children, this means that at least children them-
selves, as well as child experts from different disciplines and backgrounds, 
must be involved in the process. Such an approach not only guarantees 
that the selected functionings and capabilities are child-sensitive, but also 
that the latest knowledge about children’s wellbeing and well-becoming 
is integrated through consultation with academic and non-academic 
experts, something that might get lost if only the child’s perspective is 
taken seriously. We agree that the procedure used by Biggeri and his 
colleagues leads to important results and that the capabilities and func-
tionings it identifies are valuable to children. However, we would like 
to add two important criteria that a functioning or capability has to fulfil 
in order to qualify as significant from the point of view of justice, namely 
that it be (i) to some extent objectively measurable and (ii) influenceable 
by the institutional design of a society.
(i) The chosen capabilities and functionings should, at least to some 
extent, be objectively determinable and not merely subjective, i.e. not pri-
marily dependent on the assessments, experiences and evaluations of the 
subjects in question. Justice should guide the design of institutions and 
policies, which demands that the wellbeing of different children be com-
parable and that the ways in which it can be influenced and changed be 
objectively comprehensible. Furthermore, the distribution of such capa-
bilities and functionings is more likely to be supported by the public due 
to the limited possibility for cheating (Anderson 2010). In this sense, capa-
bilities and functionings that are only subjectively accessible pose a prob-
lem. Capability scholars usually also point in this regard to the malleability 
and adaptiveness of the preferences of human beings. In poverty research, 
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for instance, it is a well-known phenomenon that people are satisfied with 
their circumstances despite their suffering from different kinds of hard-
ships. In such cases, giving too much emphasis to subjective experiences 
would clearly distort the picture we get from their situation and lead to 
accepting the given and existing injustices. While relevant for all human 
beings, the special characteristics of children should lead to the conclusion 
that these ‘adaptive preferences’ have to be taken particularly seriously.
(ii) The second criterion is that the chosen capabilities and function-
ings should not only be relevant for the wellbeing and well-becoming of 
the child, but they must be, at least partly, societally influenceable. This 
does justice to the intuition that justice only applies to aspects of society 
that can be changed by its social institutions. If the distribution of a capa-
bility or functioning cannot be influenced by the institutions of a society 
and its distribution among children cannot be controlled in a meaningful 
way, then it would lie beyond the scope of social justice to guarantee it up 
to the relevant threshold. In such cases, where some children lack a basic 
functioning or capability while others enjoy it, it would be more appropri-
ate to speak of ‘tragic fate’. This does not imply that the society in ques-
tion has no obligation to help these children and to alleviate the conse-
quences of such natural inflicted harm and disadvantage, but the harm and 
disadvantage themselves are not an injustice and the fact that some chil-
dren enjoy the said capabilities and functionings while others do not is not 
unjust per se (Nussbaum 2006). For example, if a child is born with a 
severe disability that prevents him or her from acquiring more than rudi-
mentary skills and competencies, society has an obligation to provide the 
best treatment and care feasible. In doing this, adequate support and a 
good social environment make an enormous difference, and in many 
cases, at least some functionings and capabilities can be developed. But 
this will not change the fact that other children will be more competent 
and autonomous and have far more chances in life. Here it becomes clear 
that a capability or functioning, e.g. being healthy, is in some cases heavily 
socially determined, based, for example, on access to health care or a 
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supporting environment. It can thus be influenced by changes in the social 
structure of a society. However, sometimes even the best support cannot 
change or eliminate natural differences, and highly unequal functionings 
and capabilities will be the result without there being a problem of justice 
(Venkatapuram 2011).
The second question we named is concerned with the problem of 
determining how many of these capabilities and functionings children are 
entitled to as a matter of justice. We cannot discuss this in detail at 
the present juncture, but broadly speaking we see a sufficiency rule of 
distribution as the best solution, which seems to be adopted by many 
representatives of the capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2011; Anderson 
1999). This implies that all children have a right to a sufficient minimum 
of the relevant capabilities and functionings. In order to determine the 
concrete thresholds, it is not possible to give an answer without further 
knowledge of the context and the target group. A five-year-old has 
 different needs in terms of healthcare, education and social and emotional 
support to achieve certain capabilities and functionings than a twelve-
year-old. In some cases, it will not be possible for children to reach this 
socially just minimum if the causes underlying his or her condition are 
not changeable, as would be the case with a non-treatable illness. In such 
instances, there is no injustice. It is also conceivable that helping a few 
children to reach this minimum would demand significantly lowering the 
wellbeing of many others, without violating their claims of justice in 
regard to the minimum to which they are entitled. One possible solution 
to this problem was formulated by J. Paul Kelleher, who distinguishes 
between a demand-side and a supply-side sufficiency view (2015). He 
claims that supply-side sufficiency in capabilities and functionings implies 
that those who have certain obligations and duties of justice must put 
sufficient effort into fulfilling them. Hence sufficiency no longer entails 
unreasonable demands that would significantly lower the wellbeing 
of those in question. While we agree with this, we would add that the 
demand-side sufficiency view still has its merits. On the one hand, it 
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focuses on the victims of injustice and prioritizes their claims. This gives 
them the weight they deserve because, ultimately, they are what matters. 
A supply-side view must be aware of the danger it poses, namely being 
used by the better-off to avoid their responsibilities. In a public deliber-
ation about how much is enough, victims of injustices are most likely to 
be in a weaker position to argue for the demand-side view from which 
they will profit most, in comparison to those in a more favourable posi-
tion, who argue for the supply-side view. On the other hand, and more 
importantly, the amount the better-off can be reasonably expected to 
give, i.e. the determination of the extent of the supply-side responsibili-
ties, cannot be separated from the demand-side, but is to be conceived 
rather as the just answer to it. Kelleher acknowledges this but, as we see 
it, does not give this point enough weight. Only the demand-side view 
can provide the necessary information for the supply-side view, and not 
the other way around. If a child is severely deprived, then the justified 
demands are higher than if that child needs fewer resources to reach a 
just minimum in capabilities and functionings. Based on this demand-side 
information, the supply-side view can be brought in.
These are just some suggestions as to how the CA can be specified 
considering two crucial questions in regard to justice for children, sugges-
tions that have to be scrutinized and developed further. There are cer-
tainly many more issues that ought to be addressed in depth – for exam-
ple, how the developing nature of children can be adequately grasped in 
the metric of functionings and capabilities, which restrictions of auton-
omy can be justified towards children and on what grounds responsibil-
ities can be identified and distributed among different agents in the child’s 
environment. In light of these considerations, we hope that this special 
issue fulfils two functions. On the one hand, it should help clarify and 
deepen our understanding of the CA as a theory both to describe and 
evaluate disadvantages children face. On the other hand, it should illus-
trate how the CA can already be applied to concrete cases and challenges 
where injustices are happening to children.
98869_Ethical Persp_2016-1_01_Introduction.indd   10 3/03/16   09:58
— 11 —
Ethical Perspectives 23 (2016) 1
introduction
Securing Justice for Disadvantaged Children
So far we have discussed the CA from two different perspectives. On the 
one hand, we explored its use in defining and researching disadvantages, 
both theoretically and empirically, and sketched some of its aspects that 
have to be specified in order to turn it into a partial theory of justice for 
children. Where does this leave us with regard to the basic question of 
what the CA has to offer in securing justice for disadvantaged children? 
To begin with, it is important to understand that the two aforementioned 
functions of the approach are intertwined. They may be separated analyt-
ically, as we have done in this introduction, but ultimately they become 
deeply connected. In fact, we believe that it is crucial for a theory that 
wants to deal comprehensively with disadvantages in childhood to be able 
to fulfil both of these functions. There is no value free treatment of this 
subject and it is necessary to have some normative guidance for empirical 
applications. This becomes clear, for example, if it is recognized that the 
selection and evaluation of functionings and capabilities used to research 
disadvantages of children empirically depends on normative reasoning 
and often incorporates considerations of justice as well. Research into the 
wellbeing and well-becoming of children is typically motivated by the aim 
of making certain institutions or social contexts better and more just, 
even if this goal is not made explicit. The CA recognizes this entangle-
ment from facts and values from the start and does not pretend – as 
sometimes happens in the social sciences – to be able to approach phe-
nomena like disadvantage from a non-normative perspective. This will 
often make it more difficult to come to clear results, since one central 
feature of normative debates is that they do not have a well-defined end 
and that they call for constant scrutiny and revision. However, we agree 
with Sen that concepts such as wellbeing, inequality and thus disadvan-
tage are broad and partly opaque concepts (1992, 48), which have to be 
approached via an open, context-sensitive and normatively guided 
approach. It is not only important, however, that empirical researchers 
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understand the importance of normative reasoning; philosophers and eth-
icists also have to acknowledge that their theories have to connect with 
the real world if real improvements for real people – in our case children 
– are their goal. The CA, as we have introduced it here, does well in this 
regard. Its strength does not stem from its highly abstract and idealized 
principles. It is not a full theory of justice that can describe a just society 
in all its details. Rather, it claims to be able to give normative guidance 
for problems we are facing in close dialogue with the empirical sciences. 
The selection of valuable functionings and capabilities will vary with the 
phenomena in question, and even if some lists are plausible and widely 
applicable at an abstract level (as some insist is the case with Nussbaum’s 
list), it is still necessary to specify the exact content of the relevant func-
tionings and capabilities and to define a threshold that should be reached 
by everyone. For the issue of securing justice for disadvantaged children, 
this means that there will be no easy answers. Rather, the CA provides 
the framework for assessing disadvantages in all their varieties – we men-
tioned material, social and bodily ones –, to identify those that are indeed 
a problem for a just society and to point to their solution.
This brings us to the final point we would like to make. The CA is 
more than just a research paradigm: it is a philosophical theory that is 
deeply concerned with the injustices of our world and ways in which to 
solve them. For the CA, it is not enough to remain in philosophical 
 theorizing and empirical analyses. Rather, it seeks to bring in a critical 
perspective concerning social norms and institutions allowing, or even 
producing, such vast amounts of disadvantages for so many children. 
It seeks, therefore, to initiate change at different levels of society and 
to try to bring together academics, NGOs, civil society and, of course, 
 policy makers in order to find ways to tackle the challenges we face today 
in many areas, one of which relates to disadvantaged children. We hope 
that this special issue can contribute to the conceptual, normative and 
practical debates in question and bring forward the central goal of making 
the world a better place for children.
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Overview of the Contributions
Throughout this special issue of Ethical Perspectives, we propose to 
delve into both theoretical and practical problems concerning social jus-
tice and childhood from the perspective of the CA as we have described 
it above. Thus, the articles by Bonvin and Stoecklin and Drerup address 
theoretical questions about the CA as a theory within the wider landscape 
of political philosophy that could potentially change the way children’s 
rights are implemented. The articles by Cabezas, Josefsson, and Triviño 
focus on diverse practical challenges in terms of justice for disadvantaged 
children. Yousefzadeh and Gassmann face the concrete challenges con-
cerning deprived children in difficult contexts, as is the case of Iran.
Bonvin and Stoecklin advocate for the CA as a useful tool to analyse 
children’s wellbeing and agency given the fact that it does not make the 
traditional disjunction between wellbeing rights and agency rights. In their 
article “Children’s Rights as Evolving Capabilities: Towards a Contextu-
alized and Processual Conception of Social Justice”, they articulate how 
the CA offers an integral understanding of human beings, combining 
different elements such as vulnerability and agency. In fact, the CA, they 
argue, has a crucial role to play in identifying the individual and social 
conversion factors that would facilitate – or prevent – rights on paper 
becoming realities. They thus argue in favour of the CA as a perspective 
that can help implement social justice for children. Their work points to 
two main questions. Firstly, and contrary to what other approaches high-
light, the CA does not label children as exclusively passive beings, but as 
active capable agents with intentionality, who are both vulnerable and 
competent at the same time. Secondly, they emphasize how the CA can 
establish individual and contextual factors that may have an impact on 
children’s rights and capabilities. Finally, they also underline how a dia-
chronic approach through the complex concept of ‘evolving capabilities’ 
will be crucial for managing challenges concerning children’s rights and 
wellbeing. In doing so, they avoid falling into the traditional dualism that 
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sees children as dependant and adults as essentially autonomous. This 
leads them to insist that, in order to protect children’s rights, their inter-
ests and choices – that is, their wellbeing and their agency – have to be 
explicitly linked, thus reflecting the actual interactions of individual capac-
ities and social contexts.
For his part, Drerup develops a critique of a hot topic in Nuss-
baum’s approach, namely the incompatibility of perfectionism with polit-
ical liberalism. In his article “Liberalism without Perfection? Autonomy, 
Toleration and Education in Nussbaum’s Capability Approach”, Drerup 
reflects on the problem of keeping the capabilities approach free from 
perfectionism, as Nussbaum argues, while it continues to fall into those 
premises as a normative theory. Drerup offers a sharp critique of the CA, 
pointing out the need to rearrange its justificatory framework. In his 
view, this step is necessary in order to surpass and unravel the main 
tensions resulting from Nussbaum’s attempt to make her version of 
political liberalism compatible with her core assumptions regarding the 
CA. He starts with Nussbaum’s defence of anti-perfectionism in educa-
tion, making explicit the fact that her rejection of education for personal 
autonomy as a reasonable policy aim of liberal states entails indefensible 
implications and implausible assumptions in both normative and metae-
thical fields, as perfectionism is actually the base of her defence of edu-
cation for tolerance and equal respect. Likewise, his article illustrates how 
Nussbaum’s attempt to combine resources from incompatible frame-
works may lead to a new waterfall of theoretical challenges when it 
comes to maintaining consistency among diverse premises. Finally, he 
brings into the discussion the fact that the CA should face a crossroads 
and decide whether it should advocate for a pure political liberal justifi-
cation or, rather, support Nussbaum’s anti-perfectionist approach, given 
the high cost of the first option.
Shifting attention now to the applied part of this special issue, we 
present three articles on children’s right to love, children’s right to asylum, 
and girls’ sexual and reproductive rights.
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Firstly, Cabezas presents the debate on children’s right to love, com-
bining the CA and the theory of attachment as two theoretical resources 
to make the debate move forward beyond the pro/contra phase. Through-
out her article, entitled “The Right to Love during Childhood and 
the Capability Approach: Beyond the Liao/Cowden Debate”, Cabezas 
suggests that the main challenge lies in the lack of precision regarding the 
human affective dimension, as also happens with Nussbaum’s so-called 
capability of emotions, mixing terms such as love, care, or attachment.
Thus, in the interest of a functional theory of social justice, Cabezas 
argues that the capability of emotions should be translated into a capabil-
ity of loving well and being well-loved. She claims, therefore, that children 
should have the right to be provided with (i) healthy secure attachment, 
(ii) positive self-esteem, and (iii) well-tuned emotional and social compe-
tences. In doing so, the vague formulation of a right to be loved can be 
overcome. Finally, and before suggesting some cost-effective measures 
that might derive from it, Cabezas advocates realising the right to be 
 well-loved and to love well through these three concrete competences as 
a way of also granting other basic capabilities on the one hand, and as 
a matter of social justice on the other, since such a right would fulfil the 
criteria of objectivity and social changeability.
Secondly, in his article, entitled “Children´s Rights to Asylum and 
the Capability Approach”, Josefsson delves into the problem of child 
migration as a topic that political theory seems to have disregarded. 
 Josefsson defends the CA as a promising theory in this regard, as it takes 
into consideration children’s interests and provides wellbeing thresholds 
securing a minimum level of social justice for them. Nevertheless, his 
article also points out some limitations of this approach with respect 
to the debate on children’s right to asylum. Josefsson underlines three 
main challenges that the capabilities approach should confront, namely, 
(i) national interests in matters of immigration control, as children’s right 
to asylum is a highly political problem, questioning current international 
political organization, and legal systems; (ii) how to determine and justify 
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a concrete list of capabilities for children, taking into consideration their 
interests and agency; and (iii) how to realise a moral theory of capabilities 
in the international political scenario.
As a result, the capabilities approach should, according to Josefsson, 
clarify whether its normative suggestions apply at a national level or, on 
the contrary, refer to a global society; it should also address the question 
on how to define children’s capabilities in a political sense and make them 
liable in a democratic context; finally, it should deal with the question on 
how to make, on the one hand, the universal rights of the asylum-seeking 
child as a political subject compatible with, on the other hand, collective 
rights such as the right to self-determination of nation states. 
Thirdly, Triviño’s contribution explores the CA from a gender sen-
sitive perspective and deals with a gap in the CA related to girlhood and 
sexual and reproductive rights. “Young Bodies, Small Minds? Applying 
the Capability Approach to Girls’ Sexual and Reproductive Rights” aims 
to provide an accurate theoretical approach to girlhood in this regard. 
In order to do so, Triviño highlights the double vulnerability of girls, as 
females and children, and analyses the contextual struggles that girls 
commonly face when it comes to making their own decisions with 
respect to their sexual and reproductive life. From this starting point, 
Triviño advocates for the CA as an appropriate theoretical background 
to provide tools for implementing girls’ rights. She argues that some of 
the central capabilities will be negatively affected by a lack of respect 
for sexual and reproductive rights already recognized on paper. In doing 
so, she claims that an adequately settled sexual health care service, as 
well as the implementation of precise sexual education, would work as 
‘conversion factors’ in order to guarantee justice for girls, especially 
because both measures recognise and increase girls’ agency. As a con-
sequence, Triviño justifies why parental rights should not overrun a 
girl’s bodily integrity and agency. Thus, Triviño criticises the widely 
accepted prejudice against children’s ability to define preferences and 
make decisions, which is even sharper with regard to girls, and points 
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out the contradictory social beliefs and assumptions when it comes to 
girls’ sexual and reproductive decisions.
Finally, we close this special issue with a case study on disadvantaged 
children in Iran. Yousefzadeh and Gassmann’s article, entitled “Local 
Needs and Global Indicators: A Contextual Approach to Multidimen-
sional Child Deprivation”, combines the CA and Human Rights discourse 
in order to define different dimensions of child deprivation in Iran after 
the 1979 revolution as a way of reflecting children’s basic needs. Their 
multidimensional analysis of child deprivation shows, firstly, the impor-
tance of providing a definition of childhood to study a specific context, 
as the political changes in the case of Iran led to an ideologically influ-
enced definition of childhood based on Islamic law, which, in turn, 
directly affected children’s rights in terms of gender biases. Secondly, after 
presenting evidence in this regard, the authors advocate for the impor-
tance of finding working definitions for the various dimensions involved 
in deprivation during childhood, taking into consideration the historical 
and political context as a key factor for ultimately implementing children’s 
rights. In this sense, Yousefzadeh and Gassmann introduce the relevance 
of being context-sensitive into the discussion, as the CA is, in order to 
avoid instances of injustice resulting from a blind application of a univer-
salistic theory of justice.1
Gottfried Schweiger, Gunter Graf and Mar Cabezas
Guest Editors
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